On Every Front: A Strategy for the War on Terror

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Al-Qaeda and its jihadi allies continue to pose a large threat to the United States. Al-Qaeda lost its base and saw its leadership isolated from its operatives when the U.S. ousted Afghanistan’s Taliban government in 2001–2002. But al-Qaeda addressed these setbacks by morphing into a decentralized but highly potent terrorist movement that remains capable of great destruction.

And great destruction is what al-Qaeda likely intends. Al-Qaeda’s leaders have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the past, and their rhetoric suggests that they would use these weapons if they had them. In 1998 Osama Bin Laden proclaimed that “to kill Americans . . . civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”¹ A former al-Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, even claimed that al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.²

Such a grave menace requires a strong response. Yet the U.S. has so far waged only a one-dimensional war against al-Qaeda and its jihadi allies, fighting hard on one front when it should be fighting on four. Specifically, the Bush administration has focused heavily on an offensive campaign against al-Qaeda overseas while neglecting three other critical fronts: bolstering homeland defense, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, and winning the war of ideas. And the administration has sometimes lost focus and done too little on the one front where it has been fighting, partly because it diverted itself into a costly and counterproductive sideshow in
Iraq. President Bush is widely credited for toughness on terror. In fact, however, his administration has pursued a half-hearted war on terror, failing to devote the political and financial resources it requires.

Instead the U.S. should wage a far stronger war on al-Qaeda. This war should be waged on every relevant front with all needed resources. Other policies should be oriented to serve this effort and judged in part on their contribution to it. The U.S. should do this because al-Qaeda is the greatest threat that the United States now faces and failure to defeat it could bring immense calamity.

FRONT NO. 1: THE OFFENSIVE

The Bush administration has focused on denying al-Qaeda sanctuaries overseas—by destroying or deterring regimes that shelter al-Qaeda—and on rolling up al-Qaeda’s global organization through intelligence and police work. The centerpiece of this offensive was the 2001 smashing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had sheltered al-Qaeda. This was an important success as it denied al-Qaeda secure access to large training bases and severed communications between al-Qaeda leaders and their global network.

Yet even this offensive element of the Bush strategy did not fully succeed because it was under-resourced and sometimes poorly led. American forces allowed the al-Qaeda top command to escape at the battle of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in late 2001. A later operation, Anaconda, also ended badly because too few American forces were committed. And ensuing allied efforts to stabilize Afghanistan were half-hearted: needed security and economic aid was not provided. As a result al-Qaeda and its Taliban allies have re-established a strong presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan and in nearby Pakistan. Pakistan itself remains unstable and cannot police its Northwest Frontier Province, allowing al-Qaeda free run of the area.

Things have also deteriorated in Somalia, where radical Islamists with ties to al-Qaeda have gained control of Mogadishu after defeating U.S.-backed warlords in June 2006.

The weakness of the Bush administration’s offensive against al-Qaeda stems partly from the administration’s decision to attack Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. The Iraq war diverted resources away from the war on al-Qaeda. For example, operation Anaconda in Afghanistan
failed partly because needed U.S. troops were withheld from the battle to conserve them for the coming war with Iraq. The Iraq war also inflamed the Muslim world against the U.S. The counter-insurgent character of the U.S. intervention is especially calamitous. A counter-insurgency presents a gruesome spectacle to onlookers. It is inherently brutal and cruel. By falling into the role of counter-insurgent in Iraq the Bush administration has damaged America’s position far beyond Iraq and given al-Qaeda a big boost.

Thus even on the offensive, its favored mission, the Bush team has shown an uncertain hand and allowed itself to be distracted from its objective.

FRONT NO. 2: THE DEFENSIVE

The Bush administration’s homeland defense effort has large holes. It has increased funding for homeland security functions since 9/11 but should do much more. The FBI remains focused on crime solving, not terror prevention. Local law enforcement, a front line in the war, has not been fully engaged in the struggle against terror. The U.S. government still has no single, coordinated national watch list of terror suspects. Such a list is a basic and essential tool of counter-terrorism. Yet the United States instead maintains several different watch lists, feeding confusion among security personnel on the front lines.

U.S. nuclear reactors and chemical plants remain vulnerable and inviting targets for terrorists. Clever attacks on these reactors and plants could kill tens of thousands or more. U.S. ports remain open to devastating attack. U.S. biodefenses have been strengthened but the U.S. remains vulnerable to bioterror. U.S. insurance laws governing terror give businesses little incentive to harden their infrastructure against an attack. U.S. borders remain essentially open.

The CIA has been damaged by a campaign against CIA employees who were deemed unfriendly to the Bush administration. This campaign caused an exodus of able officers from the CIA when their expertise was badly needed.

This situation reflects the administration’s decision to focus its efforts on the offensive while doing only enough on homeland security to give the appearance of action. At this point homeland security is more a palliative to public fear than a real security program.
FRONT NO. 3: SECURING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Vast nuclear and biological weapons and materials remain poorly secured in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Enough nuclear materials remain poorly secured in Russia to make tens of thousands of Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. Many Soviet nuclear and biological-weapons scientists also remain underpaid or unemployed, ripe for hiring by terrorists. Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have all failed to move strongly to lock down these materials and scientists. The U.S. spends only some $1.3 billion per year on the project (through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, or CTR) and will not have it finished for years. The CTR program lacks a strong, visible leader who can make things happen in Washington and Moscow. Duck and cover! This policy lapse is among the worst failures of government in modern times.

Funding for CTR should be tripled. And a strong political figure—a James Baker type—should be put in charge of the effort. The President should empower this leader to use the full array of American carrots and sticks to get results from Russia’s President Putin.

A strong-handed approach should also be taken toward securing WMD around the rest of the world, including poorly secured nuclear materials in Pakistan and in scores of research reactors elsewhere. During the Cold War the U.S. unwisely dispersed enough nuclear material to make perhaps 1,000 nuclear bombs to 43 countries around the world, starting in the 1950s and ending in 1988. The U.S. government has since made only lackadaisical efforts to recover these very dangerous materials, which are ripe for theft or illicit purchase by terrorists. These materials must be secured immediately.

FRONT NO. 4: THE WAR OF IDEAS

To defeat al-Qaeda the U.S. must reach a modus vivendi with the wider Muslim world. The Islamist jihadi movement from which al-Qaeda grows must be reduced, isolated, and drained of energy. This requires changing the terms of debate in the Muslim world. The jihadis feed on political and historical myths and lies, and also on anger stemming from political and social realities in the Mideast, especially the Israel-Palestinian conflict. These myths must be dispelled by strong U.S. public diplomacy, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be dampened by a strong new U.S. push for peace.
Public diplomacy. The al-Qaeda recruiting narrative is a farrago of historical fabrications and half-truths. Al-Qaeda portrays the last century as a period of vast unprovoked one-way violence by the U.S. and other non-Muslim states against a benign Muslim world that was innocent of wrongdoing. If this narrative were true it would indeed justify Muslim rage. The crimes of the West would cry out for a punishing response.

But violence has in fact run both ways between non-Muslims and Muslims. Western states have committed great cruelties, including horrific barbarism by France, Britain, and Italy in their efforts to subdue colonies in Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere; the 1953 U.S. coup in Iran; and a cynical U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during 1989–1992 that left it in flames. On the other hand, Muslim Sudan’s government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese during 1975–2000 and 400,000–500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965. Muslim Turkey massacred 600,000–1,500,000 Christian Armenians in 1895 and 1915, in one of the great genocides of modern times. Thus the recent history of Muslim-non-Muslim relations is one of great crimes committed by both sides. Both should confess their crimes, hang their heads in shame and ask forgiveness.

Muslims, especially the Islamist extremists, also have much Muslim blood on their own hands. These crimes include the slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan’s Islamist government since 2003, the killing of many thousand Afghan Muslims by the Taliban during its bloody rule, and the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the violent Algerian Islamist movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), during 1992–1998. These crimes put the lie to extreme Islamists’ claims of concern for the welfare of fellow Muslims. The extreme Islamists should atone for these crimes before seeking vengeance for the crimes of others against Muslims.

Some of the western crimes cited by the jihadis are invented. In the jihadi narrative the U.S. interventions in Somalia (1992–94), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) are painted as violent predations against Muslim populations. This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record. The U.S. committed serious mistakes in these interventions but it intervened in each case to assist Muslims, not to harm them. Its intervention
in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence against those Muslim-majority populations and its intervention in Somalia saved over 40,000 Muslim Somali lives.

In short the jihadi narrative leaves much to debate and correct. Muslim rage would be deflated if Muslims understood this. But U.S. efforts to correct the record are half-hearted. The books, articles and media products one would expect to be produced in a serious war of ideas are not appearing. Missing are films of interviews with the hundreds of African victims maimed by al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Missing are documentaries on the murderous cruelty of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the Islamist government in Sudan against their Muslim citizens. A handful of film makers could produce these quickly but the administration is not interested. As a result of such failures grotesque and malignant misperceptions persist in the Muslim world. For example, large majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia still do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.\textsuperscript{12} U.S. efforts to destroy al-Qaeda cannot succeed while such attitudes endure.

U.S. public diplomacy is failing because the Bush team has put only scant resources into it. In FY 2003 the U.S. government spent only some $1.14 billion on the public diplomacy function,\textsuperscript{13} and in FY 2006 it spent only about $1.36 billion.\textsuperscript{14} Only $150 million of the State Department’s FY 2003 public diplomacy money was spent in Muslim-majority countries.\textsuperscript{15} These are paltry sums relative to the task at hand.

This failure in turn reflects the Bush administration’s macho approach to foreign policy. It believes that friends abroad are won by using the mailed fist. Allies are gained by instilling fear, not respect. The Caligula theory of statecraft—”let them hate us as long as they fear us”—is believed and applied. Reasoning with others is assumed to be pointless, as others are immoral cowards who understand only threat of force. Public diplomacy is for sissies. This school-yard bully attitude has led the administration into serious mistakes. The United States has powerful skills of persuasion but the Bush team has failed to use them.\textsuperscript{16}

Will the Islamic world engage in debate about historical truth? Will it agree that it must rest its claims on valid history? The Koran says it must. “Believers, if an evil-doer brings you a piece of news, inquire first into its truth, lest you should wrong others unwittingly and then regret your action.”\textsuperscript{17} The United States should embrace this teaching and propose
that both sides fully live by it. This would require that both agree to enquire about and debate the truth of history.

The Arab-Israel conflict. To win the war of ideas the U.S. must move credibly toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict inflames Arabs and Muslims against the United States.\textsuperscript{18}

To move toward peace Washington should frame its own final-status peace plan and use carrots and sticks to persuade both sides to agree. This will put the opponents of peace on both sides on the defensive. Most important, it will corner the radical Palestinian group Hamas by exposing its extremism as an obstacle to a just peace. Most Palestinians now want a two-state solution. Hamas, which won Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, rejects a two-state solution and instead seeks Israel’s destruction. It has argued that its extremism does little harm to its followers because the two-state solution that its extremism prevents was never in the cards. The U.S. can destroy this argument by making clear that it will lead matters to just such a peace if the two sides will cooperate. Hamas will then be forced to bend toward peace or lose power.

The U.S. final-status plan should involve a near-full Israeli withdrawal in exchange for full and final peace, in line with the four major peace plans that have been widely discussed in recent years: the Clinton bridging proposals of December 2000, the Abdullah Plan of March 2002, the Geneva Accord of December 2003, and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh initiative, also of December 2003. Polls show majorities on both sides favoring these terms. This gives the U.S. a lot to work with if it wants to push peace forward.

Dampen other conflicts. Al-Qaeda feeds on war. It exploits any war involving Muslims anywhere in the world by painting the Muslims as victims, whether or not they are, and publicizing their suffering. It exploits in this fashion current wars in Kashmir and Chechnya and past wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian war. Accordingly the U.S should have a policy of dampening conflict and promoting peace in Kashmir and Chechnya, as well as in Israel-Palestine. As al-Qaeda feeds on war, so the United States should be the great maker and builder of peace in the region.\textsuperscript{19}
AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY

The Bush administration advanced its own framework for strategy in its 2006 National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. In this scheme the U.S. would define and then deny the inputs that terrorist organizations require to sustain themselves and their operations. Nine key inputs are identified: (1) Leadership; (2) Safe-havens for training and planning; (3) Funds and finance; (4) Communications, needed for exerting command and control over operatives and for inspiring a broader political base; (5) Movement, needed for gaining access to targets, especially in the United States; (6) Intelligence, needed to make strategy, to plan operations, and to plan countermeasures against attack; (7) Weapons, including WMD; (8) Personnel, supplied by the recruitment, training and indoctrination of new operatives; and (9) Ideological support, needed to recruit and motivate new operatives and to gain broader support from host societies.

This scheme is an intelligent alternative to the four-front scheme that I used above. It is tied directly to the logic of terrorist organizational sustenance. This makes it especially useful for identifying tactics that will defeat terrorist networks.

However, the Bush policy against al-Qaeda looks inadequate when measured against this scheme as well. The administration is moving firmly against only four vulnerabilities (numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5—al-Qaeda leadership, al-Qaeda safe-havens, and al-Qaeda ability to communicate and move). The strategy is good but the effort is poor.

NEEDED: LARGE POLICY INNOVATION

Winning the war on terror will require large innovation in U.S. national security policy. The U.S. should put relatively less resources into traditional military functions—army, navy, air force—and far more resources into counterterror functions. These include intelligence, homeland security, diplomacy to lock down loose nukes and bioweapons around the world, public diplomacy, diplomacy to end conflicts that breed terror—including the Israeli-Arab conflict and the conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya—and nation building and saving failed states, to deny terrorists the haven-states they need to build their organizations. But the organizations that carry out these functions are politically weak in Washington, so they lose out in Washington budget battles. And like all
governments the U.S. government resists innovation, so the changes needed to defeat al-Qaeda face large political obstacles. Can the U.S. government innovate to the extent required?

Americans should want to hear the pulling and hauling of vast turf fights in Washington. This would tell them that resources and authority were being transferred from yesterday’s Cold-War-oriented agencies to Counterterror-oriented agencies.

Instead the tenor of national security policy in Washington is largely business-as-usual. The agencies that would lead in a serious war on al-Qaeda still take a far back seat to the military services. Specifically, in 2006 the U.S. spent $454 billion for the military services and their support. Meanwhile the U.S. spent only $40 billion on homeland security in 2006. And, as I noted above, in 2006 the U.S. spent only $1.31 on locking down loose nuclear weapons and materials through the CTR and $1.36 billion on public diplomacy. Thus U.S. military spending was 11 times U.S. spending on homeland security, 347 times U.S. spending on locking down nuclear weapons and materials, and 334 times U.S. spending on the war of ideas. The U.S. is like a midget with a strong right arm: powerful in one regard but only one.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which frames the plan for future U.S. military programs, is little changed from the Cold War-era. It still recommends spending vast sums on super-high-tech tactical fighters and killer submarines that now have no enemy to fight and little role against al-Qaeda. The innovation that victory against al-Qaeda requires is not underway.

CONCLUSION: NEEDED BUT STILL MISSING: A STRONG COUNTERTERROR POLICY

Before the 9/11 al-Qaeda attack the Bush administration took the terror threat lightly. On taking office in January 2001 the administration downgraded the government’s chief counterterror officer, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, to a non-cabinet level position. The President’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, belittled the al-Qaeda threat in April 2001, only five months before the 9/11 attack, wondering in a meeting “why we are beginning by talking about this one man, bin Laden,” and offering the grossly incorrect assertion that Iraq was at least as active in terrorism as bin Laden. President Bush himself dismissed a CIA briefer who warned in August 2001 of an
impending al-Qaeda attack, telling him “you’ve covered your ass, now.”

When marked indications of a terror attack were detected in early summer 2001 the administration failed to call the government to alert status—unlike the Clinton administration, which called a government alert in late 1999 on receiving warning of the al-Qaeda Millennium plot (which it thwarted). In fact the administration failed even to hold a meeting of cabinet principals to consider the terror threat until September 4, 2001, despite urgent pleas beginning in January 2001 for a meeting from Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

The 9/11 attack should have cured the administration of its torpor toward terror, but the evidence reviewed here indicates that its lassitude persists. The administration talks tough on terror but is not devoting the resources or forcing the innovations that a strong policy requires. Its bark is fearsome but its bite is mild.

Instead the U.S. should devote the full energy required to defeat al-Qaeda. This requires action on every relevant front and large policy innovation. The U.S. should also avoid further diversions from the campaign against the main enemy—the al-Qaeda network and other jihadi terrorists. For example, a military confrontation with Syria or Iran—urged by some in Washington—would be a grave mistake. Washington must keep its eye on the ball.

Al-Qaeda poses the single greatest danger to U.S. national security and defeating it must be America’s top priority. Pursuing this priority and the innovation that it requires will surely make America safer.

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NOTES


8. For details on U.S. policy toward nuclear materials security see Allison, *Avoiding Nuclear Terror: 143–50, 177; Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005*; and resources at the Nuclear Threat Initiative website (www.nti.org) and the Managing the Atom website (www.managingtheatom.org).


13. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says,” New York Times, October 1, 2003. This figure includes $600 million spent by the State Department on its worldwide public diplomacy activities and $540 million spent by the Broadcasting Board of Governors on broadcasts.


15. Weisman, “U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim World.”


19. My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists. She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of U.S. counterterror policy.


spending on national defense (the 050 federal budget account) in 2006 was $463 billion. Of this, $8 billion went to non-military security assistance and about $1 billion went to counterproliferation activities, including CTR. The remaining $454 billion went to the military services and their support. See also Cindy Williams, “National Security Budgets to Make America Safer,” in this volume, Table 1.

22. Ibid. This figure omits spending on security for Defense Department installations in the U.S.


25. Clarke, Against All Enemies: 231–32.


