

# Ideas for the War of Ideas

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## I. The Argument in a Nutshell

To defeat al-Qaeda the United States must change the terms of debate in the Muslim world, especially in the radical wing of Islam. How can the United States best accomplish this goal? What strategy should the US adopt for what is often called the "war of ideas" against radical Islam?

This paper endorses ten suggestions for the "war of ideas" that emerge from the thinking of students and practitioners of public diplomacy.<sup>1</sup>

(1) The US should invest more in exchange diplomacy. The Fulbright and International Visitor Leader Program (IVLP) are widely credited with great success. They and like programs should be greatly expanded.

(2) The US should invest far more in language training. It should fund teaching of English to Muslim-world citizens, and more important, fund teaching of Muslim-world languages to many more Americans.

(3) The US should develop effective media (TV and radio) directed at the Muslim world. Current US media (al-Hurra TV and Radio Sawa) is entirely ineffective.

The US should format this new media to emphasize Socratic dialogue. That is, it should format shows as two-way dialogue rather than one-way broadcast. Socratic methods of communication

are usually more effective, but US public diplomacy has long emphasized one-way broadcast formats. This should change.

The US should also format this new media to offer more objective news, while advancing fewer polemics or one-sided arguments. In the war between the United States and the al-Qaeda network, objective facts are more often America's friend than foe. If so, the US should emphasize objective news over polemics.

(4) The US should base its public diplomacy first on "listening" – that is, on ascertaining the views of target audiences, before developing a program for addressing those audiences. Failure to listen was a prime cause for the failure of the 2001-2002 "Shared Values Campaign," a major US public diplomacy effort early in the war on terror.

(5) The US should address the problem of extremist education in the Muslim world, especially extremist Muslim religious schools.

(6) Budgets for opinion-shaping ("war of ideas") activity should be greatly expanded. Money invested in shaping foreign opinion yields a good return but the US now spends little on opinion-shaping programs. This is penny-wise and pound-foolish.

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(7) The US should adapt its foreign policy to reflect the interests and concerns of the peoples of the Mideast. Even the best public diplomacy cannot defend foreign policies that convey contempt or damage interest that others hold dear. In a Mideast context this means supporting pluralism and good governance in the Arab world and a just peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Attacks and invasions against Mideast countries should be kept to a minimum.

(8) The United States should re-label its main counter-terror efforts, to avoid confusing itself and muddling its message overseas. The "war on terror" should become the "war on al-Qaeda"; the "war of ideas" should become the "dialogue of ideas".

(9) Trade and aid do's and don'ts for the US: Do reduce barriers to textile and food imports from the Arab/Muslim world. Don't object to Arab/Muslim world barriers against the import

of US entertainment media products – these products are widely believed to corrupt Muslim social values and are resented accordingly. Do offer prompt and generous disaster relief in the wake of natural disaster, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami. Do publicize the scope and nature of US economic aid.

(10) US communication policies should convey respect to the Muslim world by their format and content. Muslims widely feel that the United States treats them with disrespect. Showing respect is the answer.

We also offer three suggestions that are more out-of-the-box, as they call for action further afield from traditional public diplomacy activity. However, the dismal failure of US "war of ideas" efforts to date suggests the need for innovation. We think the following programs would help the US shape foreign opinion in ways that would strengthen US efforts against al-Qaeda.

(1) Today the US government largely sidesteps direct debate about the validity of the al-Qaeda narrative. This is a mistake.

Instead, the US government should move forcefully to contest and destroy the al-Qaeda narrative, including al-Qaeda theological and historical arguments. The al-Qaeda narrative is widely believed in the Muslim world, and motivates many to join or support al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda will endure as long as its narrative remains. And the al-Qaeda narrative will remain as long as it goes uncriticized.

Fortunately for the US, the al-Qaeda narrative is highly debatable, and in many regards demonstrably false. Hence the US should accept the need to engage in theological and historical argument. Toward this, the US government should build up its capacity for argument about Islamic theology by creating a small Civilization Dialogue Corps (CDC) of foreign service officers who are deeply learned in Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and history. The US government should also develop the expertise required engage in historical argument, covering the vast swath of world history encompassed by the al-Qaeda narrative. This requires experts in Islamic history and the history of relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds.

(2) The US government should seek ways to bring into being new non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that will contest the al-Qaeda narrative, and will support other US goals. Specifically, what's needed are new "naming and shaming" NGO's, in the mold of Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and Transparency Watch (TW), to address harmful ideas around the world. HRW, AI, and TW have demonstrated that naming-and-shaming is effective. States that abuse human rights or allow corruption fear criticism from these NGOs and sometimes moderate their conduct to avoid it. The new NGOs would name-and-shame in similar fashion but for a new purpose: to expose and criticize the purveyance of destructive ideas. Specifically, "Religious Hate Watch" (RHW) would monitor and criticize those who use religious authority – God's authority or the authority of a religious faith – for hate. "Amnesia International" (AI) (which needs a more sober moniker) would monitor and criticize the purveyance of false chauvinist historical narratives. The success of both organizations would abate harmful ideas around the world and thereby serve important American foreign policy goals. A difficulty lies in bringing them into being without tainting their independence. Some legerdemain will be required.

(3) The US should adopt a stronger peacemaking policy toward conflicts in and around the Muslim world. Specifically, the US should move beyond mediation and adopt a new policy of applying carrots and sticks toward belligerents, to persuade them to make peace. War involving Muslims is a tonic for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda heavily exploits in its propaganda all wars involving Muslims, with great success. Such wars also give al-Qaeda ripe opportunities for recruitment, training, networking, and fund raising. Accordingly, the US should recognize the termination or abatement of all conflicts involving Muslims as a vital US national security goal, and should use stronger measures toward that goal than it has in the past. Positive and negative inducements – carrots and sticks – are far stronger than mere mediation, and should be brought into the mix of tools.

## II. U.S. Unpopularity, Al-Qaeda Popularity: Scope and Significance

Foreign views of the United States have declined sharply since 1999-2002 and are now quite negative, especially in the Arab and Muslim world. Foreign views of al-Qaeda have also declined,

but al-Qaeda maintains a core of popular support in the Muslim world. As a result the US faces a head wind in its struggle against al-Qaeda. America's unpopularity costs it support, and al-Qaeda's remaining popularity is enough to sustain its efforts to raise recruits and money and to find haven.

Favorable opinion of the United States was quite high in many countries in 1999-2000, and remained high in 2002, but has since plummeted. In 1999-2000 favorable opinion of the US stood at a healthy 83% in Britain, 62% in France, and 78% in Germany. By 2005 US favorability had fallen to 55%, 43%, and 41% in Britain, France and Germany, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Major Muslim states also saw a large decline in US favorability during this period, from 75 to 38% in Indonesia, from 52 to 38% in Turkey, and from 77 to 49% in Morocco.<sup>3</sup>

Publics around the world now widely see the United States as a threat to their country. In fact many people see the United States as the greatest threat their country faces. Specifically, in 2007 the publics of seventeen states, including Bangladesh, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, China, Russia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Brazil identified the United States as the greatest threat to their country.<sup>4</sup> Remarkably, more Pakistanis see the U.S as a threat (64% ) than see India as a threat (45% ).<sup>5</sup> In contrast, the publics of only four states identified al-Qaeda as the greatest threat.<sup>6</sup>

Large majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia do not even believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.<sup>7</sup>

Public support for Osama bin Laden among Mideast publics has declined sharply since 2003 but remains substantial in absolute terms. Forty-one percent of the public in Indonesia and 38% of the public in Pakistan still have confidence that bin Laden would do the right thing regarding world affairs in 2007 (down from 59% and 46%, respectively, in 2003).<sup>8</sup>

Public support for the US-led War on Terror has waned across the world since 2002. Public support for US-led efforts against terror fell from 69 to 38% in Britain, from 75 to 43% in France, from 70 to 42% in Germany, from 30 to 9% in Turkey, and from 20 to 13% in Pakistan during 2002-2007.<sup>9</sup>

The war on al-Qaeda is not an election. Public opinion will not decide the contest by itself. But the unfortunate foreign public attitudes reported above matter because they prevent the US from getting important help from individuals and governments, and leave space for Al-Qaeda to find the recruits, funds and haven it needs to stay in business.

Since 9/11 important intelligence has often come from citizens who willingly "dropped a dime" on terrorist networks. Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the foiled 1994 Bojinka airliner attack, was captured on a tip in 1995 in Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), organizer of the 9/11 attack, was captured in 2003 with help from phone tips.<sup>11</sup> A 2006 al-Qaeda plot to bomb a number of airliners in midair was foiled in Britain by a tip from a member of the British Muslim community, likely saving thousands of lives.<sup>12</sup> These instances reassure us that the US has some friends in the Muslim world, but also indicate that the US would have more intelligence if it had more friends.

The harm to US security caused by untoward Muslim-world public attitudes is manifest today in the Pakistan/Afghanistan region of South Asia. Two disasters for US policy are unfolding in this region. Both stem in important part from public attitudes in Pakistan, where the US is very unpopular and al-Qaeda is somewhat popular, especially in Pakistan's northwest border region with Afghanistan. First, the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and now poses a serious threat to the Hamid Karzai government. More American troops are now dying in Afghanistan, in combat against the Taliban, than die in Iraq. The Taliban is back largely because it has a secure haven in Pakistan's northwest border areas, where it enjoys impunity from American and Pakistani forces, and can operate at will into Afghanistan; and because Pakistan's security services covertly give it support. Second, al-Qaeda's leadership has also found a secure haven in Pakistan's northwest. It has exploited this haven to scale up its training activities and to plan attacks throughout Pakistan, the Mideast, and the West. Recent reports suggest that al-Qaeda is extending its sphere of influence outward from Pakistan's remote northwest, and toward the core regions of Pakistan. With this haven in Pakistan al-Qaeda can stay in business indefinitely, and be free to grow in size, to develop expertise, and to continue its search for weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaeda grew to large scale in the 1990s, eventually developing cells in over 60 countries, partly because it enjoyed a haven in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, where it trained thousands of recruits in safety. If al-Qaeda is

allowed a secure haven in Pakistan for any length of time this dangerous cycle will repeat. Al-Qaeda will expand to become far larger and more lethal than it is today.

These twin disasters reflect Pakistani public and elite opinion. The Taliban and al-Qaeda find haven and recruits in Pakistan's northwest region because they are popular with the peoples of the northwest, while the Pakistani government and the US are wildly unpopular. And Pakistan's security services support the Taliban, and give al-Qaeda wide latitude in the northwest, partly because the US has not pressed Pakistan's government for full cooperation with its policies. The US has curbed its demands on Pakistan, in turn, from fear that broad public and elite Pakistani support for Pakistan's government might crumble, bringing the downfall of the government, if that government became too identified with the policies of a United States that is widely loathed by Pakistanis. America's hands are tied by Pakistani public attitudes. This is the price the US pays for being viewed by Pakistanis as the main threat to Pakistan, and for bin Laden's continuing popularity with the Pakistani people.<sup>13</sup>

### III. Shaping Mideast Opinion: Current U.S. Programs

Eleven projects with a total budget of about \$1 billion form the core of current US efforts to shape opinion in the Mideast and wider Muslim world.<sup>14</sup> They divide into five media projects, three international exchange programs, a group of micro-programs to support pluralism, prosperity, and gender equity, language training programs, and the overseas work of State Department ambassadors and other officials. Some of these efforts are widely viewed as successes, others as dismal failures. International exchanges and language training programs get especially good marks, while US media efforts get especially poor marks.

The most successful programs are far too small to have much beneficial impact. Thus current US efforts to shape Muslim world opinion are largely ineffective, due either to inept execution or to inadequate funding.

***Media projects: TV and radio.*** The US operates one U.S.-based Arab-language satellite TV news station – al-Hurra – and two radio operations, Radio Sawa and the Voice of America (VOA). Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa are failures. The VOA gets good marks for effectiveness but does not

broadcast in several key languages, most notably Arabic and Punjabi. Overall, US TV and radio operations directed at the Mideast are very disappointing.

Al-Hurra was launched in 2004, with the goal of pro-US coverage of US and Middle East news. Surveys show that al-Hurra attracts only a tiny audience, and has little credibility with Arab world audiences. A 2008 Zogby poll found that only two percent of Arab respondents pick al-Hurra as their favorite TV news source – the same as al-Manar, Hezbollah's news station, and vastly less than Al-Jazeera, which was picked as the favorite by 53% of Arab respondents.<sup>15</sup> (It bears mention that 67% of those surveyed considered CNN a trustworthy source in a 2004 Zogby poll, showing that not all US news outlets lack credibility.)<sup>16</sup>

Radio Sawa, launched in 2002, has more audience than al-Hurra but has little impact. Its programming consists largely of music with a little news mixed in. The news contents is too small to effect listeners' opinion on policy issues.

When it launched Radio Sawa, the Bush administration also cancelled the Voice of America's Arab language service, replacing the VOA Arab service with Sawa. This bizarre decision created a large hole in US media efforts. The VOA Arab language service reached a modest but important audience – government, business, academic and media elites – with important hard news information. That audience has been lost.

Bottom line: the US now has no credible media mechanism to communicate with Arab elites and publics. Al-Hurra is unwatched, Radio Sawa conveys little content, and the VOA Arab language service has been abolished. Something is wrong with this picture!

*Other media projects.* Three more US government media efforts bear mention: putting US diplomats on the air on Arab/Muslim media outlets; the Rapid Response Unit; and blogging.

The Bush administration was slow to put US diplomats on Arab/Muslim world media outlets after 9/11, instead taking a combative approach to Al-Jazeera (including expelling Al-Jazeera from US-occupied Iraq). The Bush team has since changed course, and now pursues a charm offensive toward Arab/Muslim media. Many more US civilian officials and military officers appear on this

media to explain, discuss and defend US policies. These appearances are often not effective, however, because US diplomats feel constrained in what they say, fearing that any remark that could be construed as anti-American will be pounced on by political pundits or members of Congress back home, and made a pretext to punish or fire them.<sup>17</sup> As a result their appearances have a scripted feel that often makes them ineffective. Moreover, very few US diplomats and almost no military officers know enough Arabic to fluently handle an interview in Arabic. As a result they are heard through translators, which reduces their effectiveness. Finally, few US officials know enough about Islamic law and theology, or about Arab history and culture, to debate related issues. As a result they are often unable to be persuasive on arguments that shape Arab/Muslim political opinion.

The State Department Rapid Response Unit monitors native-language media from around the world and produces a valuable daily report on this media. This report helps US policymakers understand how the US is being perceived abroad, and what stories are resonating in foreign media. It also helps US officials craft rapid responses to events and criticisms.

In early 2007 the State Department launched a blogging program. It maintains five or six government employees working full-time to answer and debunk disinformation on internet blogs. The US bloggers are Arabic speaking State Department employees, supervised by foreign service officers.

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*International exchange programs.* The US government operates two large exchange programs. Both are widely recognized as successful. It also recently began a promising outreach dialogue program aimed at the Muslim world.

The Institute of International Education (IIE), founded in 1919, is the largest exchange program in the world. Under its auspices 18,000 men and women (4,000 American and 14,000 foreign) from 175 nations participate in exchange programs each year.

The Fulbright Fellowship Program is the flagship of the IIE. It awarded some six thousand grants in 2006, at a cost of more than \$235 million, to US students, teachers, professionals, and scholars to study, teach, lecture, and conduct research in more than 150 countries, and to their foreign counterparts to engage in similar activities in the United States.

The International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), begun in the 1950s, annually brings to the US some 5,000 foreign nationals from around the world to meet and confer with their professional counterparts and to experience America firsthand. These visitors are current or potential leaders in government, politics, the media, education, labor relations, the arts, business and other fields. They are selected by American foreign service officers overseas. By all accounts these visitors learn and teach a great deal on their visits, especially if their visits are lengthy (more than a couple of weeks). Former IVLP participants include more than 200 current and former chiefs of state and 1,500 cabinet-level ministers.

Citizen Dialogue is new program that sends US Muslim citizens around the world to engage in dialogue (town hall meetings and media interviews) with foreign Muslims. These meetings are often run through US embassies. This program is too young to evaluate but it seems a wise way to use the talents of the US Muslim community.

***Projects to support pluralism, prosperity, and gender equity.*** The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), begun in 2002, oversees a large group of micro-programs to support democracy, education, economic growth and the empowerment of women. MEPI operates mainly in the weakest/least important Mideast states. It does little in our closest allied countries, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. MEPI's biggest challenge is to promote political reform in countries run by autocrats, thereby undermining the same governments that the United States relies on for strategic cooperation. Most of MEPI's early funding has gone to assisting Mideast government agencies or officials, despite MEPI's mission to focus on civil society groups. Overall, MEPI has achieved little. It has the look of an under-funded window-dressing program, organized to allow the US to claim some engagement with the issues that MEPI is tasked to address, but without real engagement.

***Language training.*** The US government sponsors language training to teach others English, and to teach Americans Arabic and other Muslim-world languages. US language training programs are very valuable, very successful, and far too small.

Karen Hughes, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (2005-2007), claims that the US has engaged 20,000 young people in 44 Muslim-majority countries in English language programs. This is a decent start but only a start, given the vast size of the Muslim world

(1.3 billion people). Language training for foreigners is cheap and the US should provide it widely, especially for non-elite young people who otherwise could not get training.

The National Security Language Initiative, introduced by President Bush in 2006 provided \$100 million for increased foreign language training (including Arabic) in elementary school through college in the US, and for fellowships for American students to study the language abroad. This program is very effective but far too small. It should be scaled up to several times its current size (\$100 million). Quality training candidates are available. The US government received over 6000 applications for the 367 language training scholarships available in 2007. If so, the US government turned away 5,600 people (over 93% of applicants) who wanted to help shore up America's language skills, now a key US weakness in its struggle against al-Qaeda. As noted above, the State Department and US military still have very few Arabic speakers. Those they have are often no better than Level 3 skills (which are good enough to translate basic documents but not for conducting regular government business, for which Level 4 or 5 – the highest level – are required). Expanding the National Security Language Initiative could help cure this shortfall.<sup>18</sup>

*Ambassadors.* US ambassadors and other State Department officials do important work shaping debate and perceptions abroad. Their foreign placement allows them to learn local culture and develop relationships that can help them be heard when the need arises. Funding for their activities is notoriously meager, especially when compared to the Defense Department and other security agencies. The Defense Department budget was 33.7 times the size of the State Department budget in 2007.<sup>19</sup> There are more musicians in US military bands than there are officers in the State Department. There is something wrong with this picture as well.

## IV. Shaping Mideast Opinion: Suggestions from Experts

A valuable reform menu has been offered by scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy in recent years. The first three suggestions follow from our remarks above, the last seven emerge from other scholarly research and practitioner experience.

1. *Expand exchange diplomacy.* Public diplomacy experts and practitioners widely agree that exchange diplomacy is highly effective and repays large dividends on money invested in exchange

activity.<sup>20</sup> Giles Scott-Smith notes that exchange programs are "an oft-neglected but arguably most successful element of public diplomacy".<sup>21</sup> He adds that US foreign services officers have consistently reported that exchange programs are "one of the most effective means to influence opinion abroad. In particular, US ambassadors rate the IVLP as the most useful of all public diplomacy tools available to them."<sup>22</sup> The experience of other countries confirms these judgments. For example, Franco-German exchanges after World War II are widely deemed an important ingredient to Franco-German rapprochement.<sup>23</sup> Implication: US exchange programs should be greatly expanded.

2. *Expand language training.* This simple step will expand the US government's capacity to conduct a wide range of activities, including public diplomacy activities.

3. *Develop effective media (radio and TV) communication toward the Muslim world.* Al-Hurra and Radio Sawa are not doing the job. They must be remade, and/or new media institutions must be developed.

Any new media institutions should observe two elements of best public diplomacy practice that have been neglected in past US public diplomacy efforts: Socratic dialogue over monologue, and truth over polemics.

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Past US public diplomacy efforts have favored one-way monologue over Socratic back-and-forth dialogue. Recorded broadcasts have predominated over talk shows and call-in shows on al-Hurra, and Radio Sawa has no political talk shows. All evidence indicates that this the wrong approach. Monologue format is less effective than dialogue. People listen better to people who listen to them, and listen better when they are also allowed to speak. Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault observe that "the need to be heard is a fundamental characteristic of human nature," and "a century of communication research demonstrates that the need to be heard represents an almost universal human characteristic."<sup>24</sup> As they note, democratization researchers report that "individuals are more likely to feel favorably toward those with opposing viewpoints and consider political outcomes fair ... if they have the opportunity to engage in discussion and debate."<sup>25</sup> Moral of the story: a reformed US media operation should favor dialogue over one-way monologue.

This means empowering US ambassadors and other officials to engage in debate about history and current US policy. Empowering US officials in this fashion in turn requires protecting them from attack by domestic primitives. Many US officials are understandably leery of leading Socratic dialogue because a small slip on camera can cause a career-ending firestorm at home. Hence a high-level presidential commitment to insulate US officials from attack, and to counter-attack on their behalf, is required.

Broadcasting can emphasize objective news or more one-sided advocacy. British public diplomacy broadcasting has long emphasized objective news, as heard on the BBC. US public diplomacy has emphasized advocacy. This is a mistake, for two reasons. First, successful persuasion depends on credibility, and credibility best earned by offering objective information.<sup>26</sup> Second, the facts in the war on al-Qaeda are mainly on America's side. Bin Laden is in fact a bad guy. Al-Qaeda is a bad outfit with a bad program. Islamist rule has been a cruel failure in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Iran. The US is not out to destroy Islam. If so, US public diplomacy should favor formats that feature objective facts.

4. *Base public diplomacy first on listening – that is, on ascertaining the concerns and views of a target audience before addressing that audience.*<sup>27</sup> Past US public diplomacy programs have sometimes faltered because the US talked before listening. For example, the US Shared Values campaign of 2001-2002, which advertised the high quality of life enjoyed by Muslims in America, was nicely produced but addressed a question that the Muslim world was not asking.<sup>28</sup> Muslims around the world were concerned with US policies toward the Muslim world, not with conditions of life for US Muslims, so the "Shared Values" campaign talked past them.<sup>29</sup>

5. *Address extreme Islamic education in Muslim world.*<sup>30</sup> Extremist Islamic education has been a conduit for the al-Qaeda narrative in parts of the Muslim world.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly, the US should put priority on moderating the curricula of extreme Muslims schools or putting them out of business. Such schools often exist because public schools are inadequate, and because overseas (often Saudi) funders are available. The US can improve things by helping governments to provide better public education, which can then replace the extremist schools; and by pressing foreign donors to stop donating, or pressing their governments to make them stop donating.

6. *Bigger budget and better leadership for public diplomacy.* US public diplomacy has failed since 9/11 partly because the Bush administration has put only scant resources into it. In FY 2003 the US government spent only some \$1.14 billion on the public diplomacy function worldwide,<sup>32</sup> and in FY 2006 it spent only about \$1.36 billion.<sup>33</sup> Only \$150 million of the State Department's FY 2003 public diplomacy money was spent in Muslim-majority countries.<sup>34</sup> These are paltry sums relative to the task at hand.

US public diplomacy efforts have also been poorly led. The first post-9/11 director of the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers, was a poor fit for the job. Its second director, Margaret Tutwiler, left after a brief tour of duty. Its third leader, Karen Hughes, was allowed to defer her arrival for months while the job sat empty, then left in 2007. This musical-chairs leadership reflects a failure by the Bush team to put priority on waging a forceful the war of ideas.

7. *Adopt defensible foreign policies.* Public diplomacy practitioners repeat as a mantra that successful public diplomacy requires a defensible policy to defend. Policies that are too sharply at odds with regional values and concerns cannot be sold by even the most skillful public diplomats. The United States has hurt itself in the Mideast by bolstering unpopular authoritarian Arab regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, and by giving unconditional support to Israel, to include political cover for Israel's settlement expansion activities. Such policies are very hard to justify to Arab/Muslim publics. Instead the US should gently favor pluralism in the Arab world, and should strongly back Israel within its 1967 borders but strongly oppose Israeli permanent expansion beyond those borders. It should attack, invade, and occupy Arab and Muslim states only *in extremis*, as US uses of force against Muslims provoke great resentment among Muslims. Such policies would greatly ease US efforts to win Arab and Muslim support for other US policies.

8. *Relabel US counterterror policies to align policy with threat.* The US should drop "war on terror" and "war of ideas" as catch phrases, replacing "war on terror" with "war with al-Qaeda," and "war of ideas" with "contest of ideas" or "dialogue of ideas."

"War on Terror" should be dropped because it confuses our side. It defines too many players – all terrorists – as adversaries. Thus it mixes real enemies with neutrals or non-enemies (all terrorists do not threaten the US) and so it leads us to fight non-adversaries. It also fails to set priorities among adversaries. Some hostile terrorists are far more dangerous than others, but a "war on terror" moniker for the struggle suggests an equivalence among them.

A "war on terror" label obscures the promise of a divide-and-conquer strategy toward hostile groups. It assigns them a common framing; this obscures conflicts among them. A divide-and-conquer strategy has good potential because these conflicts are often deep. For example, some elements of the extremist Sunni community voice more hatred of Shia than of Jews or Christians.<sup>35</sup> A smart US strategy could exploit this hatred to weaken extremists among both Shi'a and Sunni, and the US should use concepts that remind us of this possibility.<sup>36</sup> "War on terror" fails to do this.

"War of ideas" should be dropped in favor of "dialogue of ideas" or "engagement of ideas." The word "war" connotes one side winning or losing, imposing one's will on another, the use of coercion, and a focus on force. To Muslim ears "war of ideas" suggests a war on *their* ideas, their religion, and their culture. Using language that carries this hostile implication is a poor way to start a conversation. In contrast, "dialogue" or "engagement" implies equality among parties, respect for opinions of both sides, a conversation instead of a monologue, and an effort to find solutions that serve the interests of both sides. Muslims will join a "dialogue of ideas" with more open minds than a "war of ideas."

#### 9. *Trade and aid do's and don'ts for the US:*

- The US should reduce trade barriers against textile and food imports to the US from Pakistan, Indonesia, and other Arab/Muslim countries. This will cause workers who produce food and textiles to feel more partnership with the US; it will raise their standard of living; and it will reduce costs for US consumers.
- The US should drop objections to Arab/Muslim world barriers against the import of US entertainment media products (TV shows, films, music). The hedonism, pornography and violence in some of these media products is widely believed by Muslims to corrupt

Muslim social values and is resented accordingly.<sup>37</sup> The US harms itself by forcing this sewage down Muslim throats.

- The US should always offer prompt and generous relief to the victims of calamitous natural disasters. Aid given in times of greatest trauma is especially appreciated and long remembered. For example, US aid to the victims of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami had a marked positive effect on Indonesian views of the US<sup>38</sup> Such aid should not be an ad-hoc response, but a standing policy.
- The scope and character of US aid to Muslim-world countries should be publicized. US aid to the Muslim world is modest, but even this modest aid is largely invisible to Muslim publics. As a result Muslim publics greatly underestimate the scope of US aid.<sup>39</sup> Effort should be made to take public credit for aid given.

10. *Muslims widely believe that Americans view them and treat them with disrespect.*<sup>40</sup> This belief is a prime cause of Arab/Muslim anger toward the US. Accordingly, the format and content of all US communication toward the Muslim world should be crafted to convey respect. For example, dialogue should be favored over monologue in US public diplomacy (as discussed above) partly because dialogue requires listening, and listening shows respect. Objective news should be favored over polemics in US broadcasts partly because polemics suggest that the broadcaster believes the audience cannot recognize propaganda for what it is. In short, respect should be the watchword in all US communications.

## V. Shaping Mideast Opinion: Further Suggestions

We offer three additional recommendations. First, the US government should directly contest the al-Qaeda narrative; second, the US government should view with favor the creation of NGOs to address the use of religious authority for hatred, and the pervasiveness of chauvinist history; and third, the US government should adopt a more aggressive policy toward abating or ending conflict among and within other states, to include imposing peace on the belligerents.

1. **Contesting the al-Qaeda narrative.** The al-Qaeda movement rests on a very compelling narrative.<sup>41</sup> This al-Qaeda narrative is widely believed in radical parts of the Muslim world. As long

as the al-Qaeda narrative has traction in the Muslim world, al-Qaeda will have fertile ground to recruit, raise money, and find haven. The US government should contest that narrative directly, because it is highly effective and highly debatable, and because the US government can contest it successfully.

The al-Qaeda narrative has a theological chapter and a historical chapter. The theological chapter, in turn, has three elements: Salafist roots, the expansion of jihad, and the employment of takfir.

The theological chapter: Salafist roots. Al-Qaeda draws on the puritanical Sunni Salafist tradition, which seeks to return the Muslim world to the religious and social rules of the time of Mohammed. It rejects all Western ideas and inventions, including democracy, constitutions, human rights, international law, Western economic ideas, and so forth. It holds that the rules of government and social life should be based on the Quran, Hadith, and Sharia; and that these reject democracy.

The theological chapter: jihadism and takfir. Al-Qaeda seeks to elevate jihad to exalted status as a sixth pillar of Islam, predominating above the five pillars of traditional mainstream Islam. It also vastly expands the notion of jihad, to include actions that are excluded or forbidden by mainstream Islam: aggressive war for the spread of Islam, the killing of the innocent, and the killing of Muslims.

Mainstream Muslims recognize a duty to two jihads: an internal struggle to be a good person (the greater jihad); and combat to defend Islam against invasion (the lesser jihad). The struggle to be a good person, or greater jihad, is considered the more important of the two. The lesser jihad creates a duty to fight for the defense of Islam but no duty to aggressive war; in fact, aggressive war is forbidden by mainstream Muslim thinking.

Al-Qaeda expands jihad to both allow and require aggressive war by a theological sleight of hand. It defines any place that was once ruled or populated by Muslims, or whose rulers once paid tribute to Muslim rulers, to be "Muslim" land today. It then holds that if these lands are not governed by Muslim rulers today, they are now "under attack" by non-Muslims and must be defend, by force if necessary.<sup>42</sup> The mainstream Muslim proscription against using force to spread Islam is thereby erased, replaced by a *de facto* requirement to use force to spread Islam.

Al-Qaeda's definition of "Muslim land" embraces a vast swath of the world, including all of Spain ("al-Andalusia" in al-Qaeda's lexicon), parts of southern France and southern Italy, parts of the Balkans, Israel, and Russia, on grounds that Russian leaders once paid tribute to Muslim leaders. Al-Qaeda further argues that the allies of the "attackers" who now occupy these "Muslim land" are also legitimate targets, as they are assisting in the "attack." Most of the world becomes a legitimate target under this rubric, as most of the world is somehow allied with Spain, France, Italy, Russia, Israel, or other peoples who are now living on lands defined by al-Qaeda as "Muslim."

Al-Qaeda also expands jihad to allow jihadi violence against other Muslims. Mainstream Islam forbids the killing of Muslims by Muslims. Al-Qaeda draws on the writing of thirteenth-century writer ibn Taymiyya to escape this proscription. Taymiyya advanced the doctrine of *takfir*, holding that some people previously considered Muslims are not true Muslims, because they do not follow the correct (Salafi) interpretation of Islam and/or they support corrupt political regimes that govern against Muslim law. Under Taymiyya (and al-Qaeda) once a person is declared *takfir* they may be killed, even though they consider themselves Muslim. This argument allows al-Qaeda to direct its jihad violence against Muslims as well as non-Muslims.<sup>43</sup>

If we accept these theological parlor tricks, most of the world becomes a permissible or even mandatory target for jihadi violence. A mainstream Islam that forbids aggressive war, the killing of Muslims, and the killing of the innocent has been twisted into its opposite.

The historical chapter. The historical chapter in the al-Qaeda narrative features the claim that the West has waged an unprovoked and unrelenting war of aggression against Islam since the time of Mohammed. Alleged historical manifestations of this aggression include the Crusades, the destruction of the caliphate after World War I, the establishment of Israel, and the colonization and exploitation of Muslims by the British, French, Russians, and Americans since WWI and WWII. More recent alleged manifestations of this aggression include the US humanitarian intervention in Somalia (1992-94), the US interventions in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), Western support for the independence of East Timor from Indonesia (1999), alleged Western support for Russia in Chechnya, alleged US killing of many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis by economic sanctions directed at Saddam Hussein's regime during 1991-2001, alleged US support for India in Kashmir,

the US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), and US support for aggressive Israeli actions in Lebanon (2006) and elsewhere. As a western motive, al-Qaeda asserts that the US does not value the lives of Muslims, seeks to destroy Islam and seeks to control its oil.

Assessing the al-Qaeda narrative. How much of the al-Qaeda narrative is true, and how much false?

The theological chapter of the Al-Qaeda narrative is based on religious concepts (Salafism, jihad, and takfir) that rest on claims about the nature of Islam, not historical claims. These claims might be assessed two ways: by comparison to a "reasonable" understanding of Islam; or by comparison to the "mainstream" (majority-view) understanding of Islam advanced by Muslim scholars, with which the al-Qaeda narrative is sharply at odds. Western non-Muslims are of course not in a strong position to offer their own "reasonable" understanding of Islam. But mainstream Muslim scholars can contrast the al-Qaeda understanding of Islam with their own, and US observers can remind Muslims of their views.

The historical chapter of the al-Qaeda narrative is a farrago of historical fabrications and half-truths. If this narrative were true it would indeed justify Muslim rage. The crimes of the West would cry out for a punishing response. But it deviates far from the truth. It does this partly by making false claims, but more importantly by omitting essential truths, whose absence distorts the story into a falsehood.

Not all claims in the al-Qaeda historical narrative are false. Al-Qaeda claims that the West cares more about the lives of its own than those of Muslims civilians, props up Muslim autocrats, and backs Israel unconditionally are essentially true.

Other allegations in the al-Qaeda narrative are untrue. These include claims that the US was largely responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis under sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein during 1991-2001, engaged in predation against Muslims in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, supported Russian and Indian cruelties against Muslims in Kosovo and Kashmir, and in a larger sense has sought to destroy Islam. This portrayal grossly distorts the historical record. The western sanctions of 1991-2001 allowed Saddam Hussein enough food and medicine to care for his people; Iraqis died under the sanctions only because he refused to distribute these resources. The

US was not responsible for this suffering. The US committed big mistakes during its interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, but it intervened in each case to assist Muslims, not to harm them. Its intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo ended Serb violence against those Muslim-majority populations and its intervention in Somalia saved over 40,000 Muslim Somali lives.<sup>44</sup> The Western powers involved themselves in East Timor in 1999 to halt brutalities against the East Timorese, not to injure Muslims. The US has not supported Russian or Indian brutality in Chechnya or Kashmir, and has not sought in any sense to destroy Islam.

Most important is what the al-Qaeda narrative omits. The broad al-Qaeda narrative portrays the history of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims as a record of one-way unprovoked violence by non-Muslims. But violence between Muslims and non-Muslims has in fact been a two-way street.

Western states have committed great cruelties against Muslim societies. These include some crimes that al-Qaeda decries (horrific barbarism by France, Britain, and Italy in their efforts during 1840-1962 to subdue colonies in Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere) and some that al-Qaeda omits (the 1953 US coup in Iran, and a cynical US policy toward Afghanistan during 1989-1992 that left it in flames).

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On the other hand, Muslim Sudan's government has slaughtered two million non-Muslim South Sudanese since 1983, and it supported the murderous Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. Muslim Indonesia murdered 200,000 Christian East Timorese during 1975-2000 and 400,000-500,000 of its non-Muslim Chinese minority in 1965. Muslim Turkey massacred 600,000-1,500,000 Christian Armenians in 1895 and 1915, in one of the great genocides of modern times.<sup>45</sup> Thus the recent history of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is marred by great crimes committed by both sides. Both should confess their crimes, hang their heads in shame and ask forgiveness. Both have disqualified themselves from making claims against the other by their own egregious misconduct.

Muslim extremists also have much Muslim blood on their own hands. Their crimes include the slaughter of several hundred thousand Muslims in Darfur by Sudan's Islamist government since 2003, the killing of many thousand Afghan Muslims by the Islamist Taliban during its bloody rule,

the killing of tens of thousands of Algerian Muslims by the violent Algerian Islamist movement, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), during 1992-1998, and the killing of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a by Sunni extremists in Iraq since 2003.

In short, the al-Qaeda narrative leaves much to debate and correct. Muslim rage would be deflated if Muslims understood this.

The US government cannot leave the al-Qaeda narrative unaddressed. To do so would leave in place a powerful rationale for al-Qaeda's existence. What steps should the US take?

The US government can perhaps build up moderate Muslim voices who will dispute the al-Qaeda narrative themselves. Toward this goal the US can funnel aid to Muslim leaders, scholars, mosques, schools, and other institutions that dispute al-Qaeda's ideology, and can give a platform to moderate scholars. But there is risk that the U.S will taint those it aids, thereby undermining them.

The US government should focus instead on building up its own internal expertise on all matters related to the al-Qaeda narrative, so that its own people can debate that narrative effectively. A US government voice in this debate will be effective if it is backed by deep expertise.

Toward this goal the US government should establish a *Civilization Dialogue Corps (CDC)*. The CDC's prime mission would be to contest the theological and historical chapters of the al-Qaeda narrative. The CDC would be directed by the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy. It would be comprised of a small number of US State Department officers who are deeply learned in Islamic law and theology, and/or Muslim religious history, and/or the political and social history of the Muslim world, and/or the history of Muslim relations with the non-Muslim world. Preferably CDC officers would also speak a Muslim world language, such as Arabic, Pashto, Punjabi, Farsi, or Indonesian. Months or even years of intensive special schooling in Muslim religious and historical affairs will be required. Those who specialized in Islamic law and history would need training to the level of learned Muslim scholars.

CDC officers would be prepared to explain how the al-Qaeda theological narrative departs from mainstream Islam, and expose errors in the al-Qaeda historical narrative, while granting truthful

elements of the narrative, and advancing a mainstream view of relevant history. CDC officers would also lead in organizing and empowering voices in the Muslim world to oppose the al-Qaeda narrative.

Clearly, Muslim communities will not look heavily to US government officials for guidance to understand Islamic theology or history just because CDC officers appear on the scene. At a minimum, however, the US government would show respect to Muslims by demonstrating that its officers have worked to learn Islamic theology and history. It would also calm Muslim fears that the US is "out to destroy Islam" if US officials could demonstrate that they know that mainstream Islam is benign, and the al-Qaeda (or harabi) theology is its perverted opposite. It would sooth Muslim-world feelings if RHW officers knew enough history to admit Western wrongs against the Islamic world (while also putting these wrongs in context). And in the long run CDC officers might directly affect the terms of discourse among Muslims by pointing to facts or arguments that Islamic extremists cannot refute and that Muslims by their own research find are well-supported.

To create CDC officers the State Department could send a few of its Arabic, Pashto, Punjabi or Indonesian speakers to seminary to learn Islamic law and history. Or it could recruit American professors or other scholars of religion who have become learned in Islamic law in the course of their academic work, to spend time representing the US government in Middle Eastern media and other Mideast forums, acting as a "reserve officer" corps. Or it could recruit Muslim scholars who are willing to work openly for the US government, acting as full-time employees or as a "reserve officer" corps. They would be available free to Mideast media, such as al-Jazeera or al-Arabiya.

Some say there is no point preparing to debate the al-Qaeda narrative with Muslims because they will not let Americans join the discussion. In fact, however, the US government has excluded itself from the discussion, by leaving itself without the expertise needed to join. At this point the US government knows too little about Islamic theology or history to say anything interesting or useful about them. And who wants to dialogue with the ignorant? When the US government brings more expertise to the table it will be more welcome. It can make itself a legitimate interlocutor for Muslims by paying its dues through study and learning.

As we noted above, primitive demagogues in the US have sometimes made sport of attacking foreign service officers for moments of public candor. CDC officers cannot be effective if they fear being pilloried in this way for doing their jobs. They will need to be protected from such attacks.

2. **Creating NGOs: Religious Hate Watch, Amnesia International.** US efforts against al-Qaeda would be advanced by the work of two hypothetical non-government organizations that do not now exist. Someone should create these NGOs. The US government can not lead in creating them but could inspire friends in civil society to make them happen.

Religious Hate Watch (RHW) would name and shame the use of God or other religious authority for hatred around the world. It would model itself on other successful naming/shaming organizations: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Transparency International, and the Southern Poverty Law Center.

RHW would monitor, expose and criticize the use of religious authority for hate in every faith, and by all related organizations (churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, schools, newspapers, universities, and publishing houses). Its mission would extend to criticism of scripture that is hateful, which is found in every religion. RHW would put a challenge to religions: find a way to decommission your hate scripture. We won't tell you how to do it, but do it you must.

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RHW would also press religious communities to acknowledge wrongs that their faith has committed against others. Admission of a past wrong inhibits its repetition. Religious communities that admit their misdeeds will less often wrong others. Truth commissions have often served as a format for acknowledging wrong in the aftermath of civil conflict or human rights abuse, most famously in South Africa but also elsewhere.<sup>46</sup> Religions could be urged to follow this example and implement their own truth commissions.<sup>47</sup>

Premises that support the RHW project:

- The demon of hateful or aggressive religion is rising in the world. The appearance of al-Qaeda is part of a wider global increase in religious hatred and religious conflict. Such conflicts include North-South conflict in Sudan since 1956, Iran vs. Iraq in the 1980s, the

rise of religious motives in the Israel-Palestine and India-Pakistan conflict, and the global rise of angry fundamentalism.<sup>48</sup>

- Organized religions face little accountability for their actions. A mechanism to hold them accountable for destructive conduct is needed.
- External criticism can improve the terms of debate in morally unhinged communities, whether they are non-religious or religious in nature. The elites of the Soviet Union in the 1970s/1980s, apartheid South Africa in the 1980s, the pre-civil-war white slave-owning American South, the pre-1960s American white Jim Crow south, and the pre-Vatican II Catholic Church came to accept that their political or social systems or ideas were illegitimate partly because over many years outsiders made criticisms that they could not answer. Works like Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Life* and *First Circle* made a difference. Similar criticism of today's religious communities can put them on a better track.
- "Naming and shaming" is a demonstrated technique. NGOs that name-and-shame have proven effective in the past.
- RHW could give Western voices another useful entry-point into the intra-Islam debate on theology (along with the CDC). RHW would define itself as a neutral body that holds all faiths to the same standard. It would include members of all faiths in its leadership. Accordingly, it would be hard for leaders of any faith to refuse dialogue with it. Those who refused would show themselves as having no answers, or having something to hide. So dialogue they must.
- U.S efforts to defeat al-Qaeda are damaged by non-Muslim religious extremism as well as Muslim extremism, because non-Muslim extremism fans Muslim extremism. Extremist religious movements reinforce one another. Each uses the threat posed by the other to mobilize its followers. Islamic extremists exploit Christian and Jewish anti-Islamic rhetoric to whip up their followers, and vice-versa. Christian pastor Franklin Graham, who famously termed Islam a "very wicked an devil religion,"<sup>49</sup> and Osama bin Laden are *de facto* allies. They help keep each other in business. It would therefore assist US efforts against al-Qaeda to weaken extremists of all stripes, including Western Christian and Jewish and

Indian Hindu extremists. Hence efforts like RHW that dampen religious hate in all religious communities would help the US war of ideas/dialogue of ideas.

Key problems with the RHW project:

- "There is no accepted definition of what comprises 'the use of religious authority for hate,' and years of ecumenical discussion by theologians will be required to agree on such a definition." This is true. It only means we should move soon to start the discussion. In the 1940s there was no consensus on the meaning of "human rights" but over time a definition was agreed. In time a definition of religious hate will likewise be agreed.
- "Christian claims that the only path to God lie through Jesus are essentially hateful, but most Christians endorse this claim. If so, most Christians will oppose RHW." Christian scripture does make exclusivist claims. See Jesus quoted in John 14:6: "I am the way; ... no one comes to the Father except by me."<sup>50</sup> Many mainstream Protestants drop this claim but many evangelicals continue to make it. Talking the Christians off this ledge will not be easy.

Amnesia International would name and shame the propagation of false chauvinist history by governments, political movements and other social groups (to include religions) around the world. It would serve the war of ideas/dialogue of ideas by calming anti-American narratives worldwide, and by dampening or preventing conflicts that are fodder for al-Qaeda propaganda.

Political leaders widely use self-whitewashing, self-glorifying, and other-denigrating history narratives to mobilize public support for themselves and their programs. Such narratives are a prime cause of conflict. World War I and World War II were fueled by chauvinist historical falsehoods, which fed toxic victim ideologies, which spawned aggressive foreign policies. Hitler surfed to power on malignant lies about history and mobilized these lies to justify his aggressions.

Such lies still play a pernicious role in many situations around the world today. As discussed above, al-Qaeda inspires its followers with a fictional self-innocence, other-blaming victim narrative. Israelis and Palestinians both embrace self-whitewashing, other-blaming narratives about their mutual history. Such narratives stoke hard-line foreign policy arguments in Russia and China. They fueled Serb-Croat-Bosniak violence in the 1990s.

Since 1945 Western Europe has commonized its history-teaching, under prodding by the Georg Eckert Institute of Brunswick, Germany, and by UNESCO. Eckert and UNESCO sponsored international dialogue about history schoolbook content that helped narrow differences in history-teaching across countries.<sup>51</sup> An indigenous movement for historical truth-telling in Germany pushed German education still further in the right direction. The success of these efforts goes far to explain why war is now unthinkable in Western Europe, and shows that malignant history can be abated by concerted action. We should globalize the insight. The European example should be scaled up and replicated worldwide. An Amnesia International should be established to preemptively criticize chauvinist lies when they appear anywhere, before they cause conflict.<sup>52</sup>

The US national interest in calming chauvinist narratives worldwide lies firstly in abating false anti-American narratives, but also in abating narratives that are not directed against the US but cause war among others. Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups feed on war, as we discuss below. They feature all wars involving Muslims in their propaganda. It is therefore in the US interest to prevent wars on which they feed, even when the US or US allies are not parties to the conflict. It follows that the US has a general interest in deflating narratives that cause or sustain war.

**3. A stronger peacemaking policy: framing final status plans, using carrots, using sticks.**

The US should adopt a more muscular peacemaking policy toward conflicts in and around the Muslim world. Specifically, the US should move beyond mediation to a new policy of framing final status peace plans, and then applying carrots and sticks to belligerents to persuade them to adopt the US plan. Example of a strong carrot: a security guarantee to parties that agree to peace. A strong stick (to be rarely applied): a threat to aid the adversaries of those who prevent progress toward the US-defined settlement in the war they thereby cause.<sup>53</sup>

Al-Qaeda thrives on war involving Muslims. It exploits these conflicts for propaganda, painting involved Muslims as victims of western cruelty, whether or not they are. (Ending conflicts involving Muslims should therefore be part of the war of ideas.) It also uses such conflicts as occasions to train its followers in arts of war, to recruit, to raise funds, and to build networks.<sup>54</sup> Thus al-Qaeda propaganda features grisly images from the conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, Chechnya,

Iraq, and Afghanistan and past wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia; and al-Qaeda has used the wars in Iraq, Kashmir and Chechnya to train its operatives in the arts of violence.

The ongoing mess in Afghanistan/Pakistan illustrates the damage done by allowing Muslim-world conflict to fester. As we noted above, some of America's problems in Afghanistan/Pakistan stem from unfriendly public attitudes in Pakistani society. Four other problems stem from the India-Pakistan conflict. (1) Pakistan's security services support the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan mainly because they believe they can exert influence in Afghanistan through a Taliban proxy. They seek influence in Afghanistan, in turn, because they fear that otherwise India will dominate Afghanistan and catch Pakistan in a pincer, threatening it from both east and northwest. This concern would evaporate if the India-Pakistan conflict were ended. (2) Al-Qaeda and the Taliban run free in the northwest regions of Pakistan partly because the Pakistani army cannot control the region. The Pakistani army cannot control the region partly because it is postured for war with India, not for counter-insurgency. An end to the India-Pakistan conflict would allow the Indian army to finally focus on counterinsurgency. (3) The Pakistani military exploits the India-Pakistan conflict as a pretext to extract immense resources from Pakistani society, leaving too little money for Pakistan's public schools, leaving extremist madrasas to flourish. (4) The Kashmir conflict serves as a stage for al-Qaeda propaganda and a training ground for al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist groups. Overall, the India-Pakistan conflict is the wellspring from which the disasters of Pakistan and Afghanistan originate. Were it ended, most US problems in South Asia would dissipate.

To dampen this and other conflicts the US should use its many carrots and sticks to give belligerents an incentive to peacemake. First the US should learn the details and nuances of the conflict. Then it should develop a final status plan that is just and fair. Then it should develop means of monitoring and measuring the cooperation or noncooperation of belligerents with the plan. Then it should make clear that belligerents who cooperate will be rewarded, and belligerents to fail to cooperate will be penalized. Carrots to the peacemakers, sticks to the peace-obstructors, as defined by their support or opposition to the US peace plan.

For example, regarding Israel-Palestine, the US should reintroduce the Clinton Plan and back it with carrots and sticks (mostly carrots). This could break the logjam and finally move the parties

toward peace. Polls have long shown that pluralities of Israelis and near-pluralities of Palestinians favor the Clinton plan. What's been missing is US leadership to pull them over the line.

US carrot-waving and arm-twisting for peace would help moderates on both sides made concessions, by making clear that their concessions would lead to a just peace. Today moderates on both sides hold back from offering concessions from fear of being hung out to dry – exposed as willing to concede, with no results to show for concessions. US pressure would abate this fear of being hung out to dry.<sup>55</sup>

US carrot-waving and arm-twisting for peace would also compel radicals on both sides to moderate their goals, or risk losing support from their communities. Today extremists on both sides ( Hamas, the Israeli settler movement and its Likud allies) pay no political price for depriving their communities of peace, because they can claim that "our radical actions aren't preventing peace, as there would be no peace even if we behaved better." Hamas used this argument with success in its victorious 2005–2006 election campaign. The US can prevent this game by making clear it will lead the region to peace unless the radicals disrupt it. It will then be clear to Palestinians that Hamas really is preventing peace. Hamas will then be forced to moderate or lose support

Regarding India-Pakistan, the US should frame a Clinton-Plan-like Bush Plan, and back it with sticks and carrots. The outlines of that plan are fairly clear.<sup>56</sup> What's missing is US pressure to make the plan happen. India and Pakistan have at times seemed ready to make peace themselves in recent years. US suasion may well bring them to seal the deal.

Regarding Iraq, the US should frame a grand bargain that defines how to settle the major outstanding issues. These issues are: powers of the central government vs. the provinces; provincial borders; how control of state security services will be shared among groups; rights of provinces to organize militia; distribution of oil revenues; and the identity of Iraq (Arab or not). The US has been in Iraq long enough to know what formulas on these issues are acceptable to both sides. It should frame these formulae and coerce all the communities in Iraq to accept them. The Bush administration has blundered by meekly confining itself instead to mediation and cajoling.

Is a muscular peacemaking policy of this kind feasible? Possible problems include these:

- Muscular peacemaking requires a flexible US policy that directs US support to whichever belligerent behaves better, and shifts support from one belligerent to another when their behavior changes. But the US government doesn't do flexible. Instead, it sorts the world into white hats and black hats, and then treats them as permanent friends and permanent enemies. It is not clear that Washington is capable of learning the more complicated habits of mind that muscular peacemaking requires.
- Muscular peacemaking requires that Washington agree on a US peace proposal. But Washington will find agreement on a peace proposal hard to reach, partly because the belligerents will mobilize opposing lobbies in Washington to promote their case, creating policy gridlock.
- Do peaces imposed by outsiders endure? Some argue that resentful belligerents will return to war once they are free to do so.
- Does the US government have the expertise needed to make muscular peacemaking work? Deep knowledge of the goals and perceptions of the belligerents is required. But the US State Department has few resources, and the wider American culture is insular. As a result Americans know little of the world. Implication: Americans are the wrong people to attempt difficult social engineering in faraway lands. Muscular peacemaking may work, but Americans are the wrong people to try it.
- Can the US be a fair broker? Does it always bring goodwill to its peacemaking? Or is it biased by prejudice or ideology? (Think John Bolton, Elliott Abrams, or Senator Jesse Helms.) Is it captured by foreign lobbies who seek their own parochial goals, without regard to justice? Muscular peacemaking fails if it pursues an unjust peace. Does the US government have the needed judiciousness?

These objections warn that efforts at muscular peacemaking may not succeed. But the US should try it nevertheless. The United States has a large national security interest in peace, and should run risks to pursue it, including the risk of muscular peacemaking that might fail.

## VII. NEEDED RESEARCH ON WARS OF IDEAS

Topics relevant to the war of ideas/contest of ideas that are in need of research include these:

How are ideas transmitted across borders? What efforts to transmit ideas have succeeded? Which have failed? Why? Compare and contrast efforts by the Soviet Union and other communists to spread communism; efforts by the US to spread anti-communism; efforts by various epistemic communities to create and spread international norms; efforts by social Darwinists to spread social Darwinism, and then international social Darwinism, in the late 19th century; efforts by British leaders to spread the concept of an "English Speaking World" to English speaking states in the early 20th century; efforts by pan-Germans, pan-Slavs, pan-South-Slavs.

How did the elites of the Soviet Union in the 1970s/1980s, apartheid South Africa, the pre-civil-war white slave-owning US South and the American white Jim Crow south of the 20th century come to accept that their political or social systems were illegitimate? Did criticism from outsiders play a helpful role? (Did Harriet Beecher Stowe make a difference?) If so, what conditions allowed this? What implications follow for the possible effectiveness of outside criticism on the conduct of aggressive or extreme religious communities, including extreme Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu communities today?

How have terms of debate within religions been changed in the past? Has hate scripture been decommissioned? If so, by which religions? How did they do it?

What is the impact of education on political attitudes?

Third parties efforts to make peace: what do history and social science indicate about what works, what doesn't? Is it possible for outsiders to "impose" peace? (Meaning, coerce belligerents toward peace with carrots and sticks.) Does peace imposed by outsiders succeed and endure? Why has the US government not imposed peace in the past? Which countries have tried, with what results?

How effective are name-and-shame tactics by NGOs? How much impact do they have on states? Corporations? Religious organizations?

How can name-and-shame NGOs be constructed so that they will sustain their ethos across decades or centuries, without being corrupted or coopted?

Why is US public diplomacy so poorly funded?

Why has the US government not addressed the al-Qaeda narrative already? Is the problem lack of resources? Lack of expertise? Or fear among foreign service officers that they will be pilloried at home for making the candid self-critical comments that effective debate abroad requires?

How can US foreign service officers best be protected from domestic political attack? By a presidential commitment to defend those attacked? A concordat between the political parties not to attack them? A job tenure guarantee for those US officials called on to do dialogue with foreigners? A use of contractors to do the dialogue, to separate the message from "the taxpayer"? Educate the American public to understand the need for truth in public diplomacy? Educate the American public on the history of US foreign policy (including its dark side) and Western-Muslim relations (including the wrongs of the west) so that harsh truths about the US and the West do not sound strange to American ears?

How can US government-funded media best be protected from domestic political attack? What practices worked in other countries? How did the British government insulate the BBC from political pressure?

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<sup>1</sup> Thoughtful recommendations on improving US public diplomacy are found in: Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, special eds., Public Diplomacy in a Changing World, special edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008); Leadership Group on US-Muslim Engagement, Changing Course: A New Direction for US Relations with the Muslim World (Washington, DC: US-Muslim Engagement Project, 2008); Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World (Washington, DC: Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2005) (a.k.a. "The Djerejian Report"); William A. Rugh, ed., Engaging the Arab & Islamic Worlds through Public Diplomacy: A Report and Action Recommendations (Washington, DC: Public Diplomacy Council, 2004); Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan, A New

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Beginning: Strategies for a More Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World (New York: CRS No. 7, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2005); United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005 Report (Washington, DC: US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2005); Hady Amr, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve US Public Diplomacy with the Arab World (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004); and Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating US Public Diplomacy, Report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, September 2003).

- <sup>2</sup> Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books, 2006): 27. On anti-Americanism see also Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
- <sup>3</sup> Kohut, America: 27.
- <sup>4</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood in the Developing World (PewResearchCenter: July 24, 2007, retrieved from [www.pewglobal.org](http://www.pewglobal.org)): 45-46. Percentages of the public mentioning the US as a threat were as follows: Bangladesh, 72 percent; Turkey, 64 percent; Pakistan, 64 percent; Indonesia, 63 percent; China, 66 percent; Russia, 49 percent; Malaysia, 46 percent; Nigeria, 32 percent, and Brazil, 45 percent. In each case the US was the most-mentioned threat. *Ibid.*: 46. Even larger shares of foreign publics expressed fear that the US could become a military threat to their country in the future. Expressing this fear were 93 percent of the public in Bangladesh, 85 percent in Indonesia, 81 percent in Malaysia, 77 percent in Turkey, 73 percent in Pakistan, 65 percent in Egypt, and 63 percent in Kuwait (!). *Ibid.*: 59.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*: 52.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*: 45.
- <sup>7</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, June 12, 2006, question 38; retrieved from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253>. Disbelievers that Arabs performed the 9/11 attack outnumbered believers by 59 to 32 percent in Egypt, 59 to 16 percent in Turkey, 65 to 16 percent in Indonesia, and 41 to 16 percent in Pakistan. *Ibid.*
- <sup>8</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Opinion Trends 2002-2007: A Rising Tide: 57, 148.
- <sup>9</sup> Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Unease with Major World Powers: Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey (PewResearchCenter, June 27, 2007, retrieved from [www.pewglobal.org](http://www.pewglobal.org)): 22.
- <sup>10</sup> <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=mission>.
- <sup>11</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/12/shaikh.reward/index.html>.
- <sup>12</sup> On six major occasions since 9/11 foreign citizens "dropped a dime" to inform on al-Qaeda members or plots or other terrorist plots, leading to the capture or killing of key terrorist leaders, or thwarting the plots. These instances include the captures of Ramzi Yousef and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), and the foiling of the 2006 al-Qaeda airline bombing plot, as mentioned in the text. The breakup of the 2006 attack is reported here: <http://www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=79154&d=12&m=8&y=2006>. Three additional instances include (1) The killing of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader Hamsiraji Sali in April, 2004 in the Philippines (<http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhr393.html>). (2) The capture of Indonesian terrorist leader Riduan Isamuddin

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(a.k.a. "Hambali"), arrested in 2003 in Thailand on a tip by a group member  
(<http://www.voanews.com/uspolicy/archive/2003-08/a-2003-08-19-1-1.cfm>. (3) The killing of Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by US forces in Iraq in 2006 using data provided by a tip  
(<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html>.)

Overall, more than 40 sources have been paid by the US government for tip-offs providing information leading to capture/killing of terrorists since 9/11. These sources were paid for their information – a total of \$62 million – but gaining reward money was not the only motive for the tips. <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/>.

<sup>13</sup> This and other evidence leads the authors to disagree with Robert Keohane and Peter Katzenstein, who argue that "the effects of anti-Americanism seem to have posed no major obstacles to the war on terror that the United States has waged." Keohane and Katzenstein, Anti-Americanisms: 286.

<sup>14</sup> The Djerejian report calculated in 2003 that the US government spent the following amounts on activities directed at shaping opinion in Muslim-majority countries:

> \$150 million on State Department public diplomacy activities, including exchange programs and salaries for State Department officials.

> \$25 million for Radio Sawa in FY 2004.

> \$37 million for al-Hurra in FY 2004.

> \$100 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).

Total: \$312 million. Djerejian Report: 25-26, 29-30. Spending is somewhat higher today but not vastly higher.

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/~media/files/events/2008/0414\\_middle\\_east/0414\\_middle\\_east\\_telhami.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/~media/files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> "Alhurra, the Free One: Assessing U.S Satellite Television in the Middle East," Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, No. 11 (November, 2005).

<sup>17</sup> Two capable US officials were recently pilloried by conservative commentators and members of Congress in this fashion. After a brief tenure Larry Register was compelled to resign as director of al-Hurra in June, 2007 in the face of attacks by non-Arabic-speaking journalist Joel Mowbray in the pages of the Wall Street Journal. Register had rankled the right by his worthy efforts to improve al-Hurra. See Mark Lynch, "The Failure of Public Diplomacy," [guardian.co.uk](http://guardian.co.uk), June 16, 2007; and Abu Aardvark, "Al-Hurra Controversy: One Good Thing," [http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/05/alhurra\\_controv.html](http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/05/alhurra_controv.html). In 2006 Alberto Fernandez, director of the State Department media office and the US government's single most effective media spokesman to the Arab world, was widely attacked by conservative commentators, including National Review Online McCarthy Andrew McCarthy and blogger Michelle Malkin, for acknowledging on al-Jazeera that US policy in Iraq is not perfect. Fernandez remarked that "History will judge American [policy] in Iraq. We tried to do our best but I think there is much room for criticism because, undoubtedly, there was arrogance and there was stupidity from the United States in Iraq." Fernandez followed this mild preamble with an argument for US policies. Nonetheless a firestorm of criticism followed, and the Bush administration insisted that he recant his remarks. See Dan Murphy, "Senior US Diplomat's Candor Gets Play in Middle East," Christian Science Monitor, October 24, 2006; Abu Aardvark, "The Fernandez Problem," [http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/10/the\\_fernandez\\_p.html](http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/10/the_fernandez_p.html); and Craig Hayden, "The

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Fernandez 'StupidStorm': Misunderstanding a Diplomat's Candor," USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy Blog,

[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog\\_detail/061023\\_the\\_fernandez\\_stupidstorm\\_misunderstanding\\_a\\_diplomats\\_dandor/](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/061023_the_fernandez_stupidstorm_misunderstanding_a_diplomats_dandor/).

Public diplomacy scholar Marc Lynch notes that "I've been told by all kinds of old public diplomacy hands that Public Affairs Officers live in fear of having some off-hand comment picked up, translated and sent back to Washington to kill their careers." This "has a chilling effect on would-be public diplomats. ... The partisan attack dogs who want to collect a scalp may care nothing about how this might affect the American national interest, but I hope that more serious people do." Abu Aardvark, "The Fernandez Problem."

<sup>18</sup> As of early 2007 only ten US foreign services officers in Baghdad had level 3 Arabic speaking and reading skills, and five more had level 3 Arabic speaking skills. This tiny band of Arabic speakers is far too small for the need in Iraq. Iraq is the most important Arabic-speaking place in the world for the US at the moment. The US government's inability to staff its Iraq operation with appropriate language specialists shows that the shortage of US Mideast language skills is acute.

<sup>19</sup> The Department of Defense received about \$550 billion in 2007, as compared to \$290 billion in 2001; the State Department received \$16.3 billion in 2007, as compared to \$7.5 billion in 2001. See also David J. Kilcullen, "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict".

<sup>20</sup> Discussions of exchange diplomacy include: Nicholas J. Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008): 33-34, 40-42, 45-46; Nancy Snow, "International Exchanges and the US Image," *ibid.*: 198-222; and Giles Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programs Within International Relations Theory," *ibid.*: 173-195.

<sup>21</sup> Scott-Smith, "Mapping the Undefinable": 174.

<sup>22</sup> "Mapping the Undefinable": 174.

<sup>23</sup> Cull, "Public Diplomacy": 40-42.

<sup>24</sup> Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arseneault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 616 (March 2008): 10-30 at 18-19.

<sup>25</sup> Cowan and Arseneault, "Moving from Monologue to Dialogue": 19. All US public diplomacy media is not in monologue format. Starting in 1994 the Voice of America announced an intent to move from "dialogue to monologue," and launched a range of call-in shows in more than a dozen languages. These call-in shows have been popular and are still flourishing. *Ibid.*: 18. Any new US media should learn from the VOA's experience.

<sup>26</sup> The success of public diplomacy campaigns often rides on the credibility of the messenger. British public diplomacy toward the United States during 1939-41 was both credible and successful. See Cull, "Public Diplomacy": 42-43. In contrast, United States public diplomacy about Vietnam and Soviet cold war public diplomacy lacked credibility and had little success. *Ibid.*: 44-45. Advocacy can sometimes succeed as well. An example is found in the Reagan administration's campaign to persuade Europeans to support theater nuclear missile deployment in Europe in 1983.

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Ibid.: 38-39. But much of what the US needs to convey in the war on al-Qaeda can be better conveyed by objective news presentation.

<sup>27</sup> Offering this argument is Cull, "Public Diplomacy": 32, 37-38.

<sup>28</sup> Cull, "Public Diplomacy": 43-44.

<sup>29</sup> In contrast, Switzerland successfully upgraded its global brand during 2000-2007 with a campaign that rested on careful research on global public views of Switzerland. Cull, "Public Diplomacy": 37-38.

<sup>30</sup> A useful discussion is Peter Krause, "Victory By Other Means: The Role of Education in Combating Islamic Extremism" (MIT, manuscript, 2007).

<sup>31</sup> Much of the Taliban's senior leadership graduated from the Haqqania school outside Peshawar, Pakistan, and students from a religious boarding school in Indonesia may comprise the core of Southeast Asian Islamist networks. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005): 80-81. On the effect of madrasas see also Jamal Malik, ed., Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror? (London: Routledge, 2008); and Saleem H. Ali, Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassahs of Pakistan (unpublished ms, 2005).

<sup>32</sup> Steven R. Weisman, "US Must Counteract Image in Muslim World, Panel Says," New York Times, October 1, 2003. This figure includes \$600 million spent by the State Department on its worldwide public diplomacy activities and \$540 million spent by the Broadcasting Board of Governors on broadcasts.

<sup>33</sup> US Congressional Research Service, US Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations (RL32607; May 1, 2006), by Susan B. Epstein; 5, estimated from Figure 1. Accessed on 5/30/06 at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66505.pdf>.

<sup>34</sup> Weisman, "US Must Counteract Image in Muslim World."

<sup>35</sup> Leaders of the Al-Qaeda camp where al-Qaeda operative Omar Nasiri trained expressed more hatred of Shiites than of Christians or Jews, and voiced more hostility toward Iran than toward Israel or the US. Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al-Qaeda: 179.

<sup>36</sup> The need for a new label for the "war on terror" is evident in the often-muddled US public discourse about the identity of the terror threat. Commentators conflate groups that pose vastly different levels and types of threat: al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Iran, Hamas, Sunni insurgents, Islamists, Hezbollah, Abu Nidal, and other groups. They also conflate the terror problems of other states (Israel, India, Russia, Colombia, etc.) with the US terror problem, as if the US had contracted to protect all regimes around the world from their own terrorists.

<sup>37</sup> Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning: 36-37.

<sup>38</sup> Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning: 51-52.

<sup>39</sup> Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning: 49-50.

<sup>40</sup> Charney and Yakatan, New Beginning: 3-4, 56-57, 62-63.

<sup>41</sup> Sources on al-Qaeda narrative: Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin

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Laden (London: Verso, 2005); William McCants, Michael Scheuer, and Daniel Byman; more Al-Qaeda statement sourcebooks; al-Qaeda media statements.

<sup>42</sup> Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, check pages.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Qaeda further argues for large exceptions to mainstream Islam's proscription against killing the innocent in wartime – large enough to allow the use of weapons of mass destruction. See Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," Middle East Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2003): 76-92.

<sup>44</sup> On Somalia see Taylor Seybolt, "Knights in Shining Armor? When Humanitarian Military Intervention Works and When It Does Not," (Ph.D. dissertation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999): 15-17, 115-211. Seybolt estimates that more than 44,000 Somali lives were saved by US action at the cost of some 1,000-1,500 Somalis killed by western forces. *Ibid.*: 15-17.

<sup>45</sup> A 1994 study of genocide estimated that 1.4 million Armenians were murdered between 1914-1918 by the Ottoman Turkish government. See Rudolph J. Rummel, "Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 1994): 1-10. A good introduction to this genocide is Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004): 157-166.

<sup>46</sup> On the effectiveness of the South African truth commission see James L. Gibson, "Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal Assumption of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2004): 201-217. On relevant history see James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>47</sup> Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch suggests that organized religions could improve their conduct and their relations with other faiths by adopting truth commissions. Conversation with SVE, 7/07. Histories that form a useful starting point for a Christian truth and reconciliation commission include James Carroll, Constantine's Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History (Houghton Mifflin, 2001); Marvin Perry and Frederick Schweitzer, Anti-Semitism: Myth and Hate from Antiquity to the Present (NY: Palgrave, 2002); Edward H. Flannery, The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-Three Centuries of Antisemitism, rev. ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1999); Israel Pocket Library, Anti-Semitism (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974). See also relevant entries in the Encyclopedia Judaica, from which this book is excerpted; and the 2008 film Constantine's Sword, which draws on Carroll's book.

<sup>48</sup> Arguing that a dangerous millennialism is rising in all major faiths is Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2002): 91-94, 419-446.

<sup>49</sup> B.A. Robinson. "Attacks on Muslims by Conservative Protestants: Graham, Hinn, Falwell, Robertson, Swaggart, & Baldwin," Religious Tolerance, updated May 13, 2003, retrieved from [http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac\\_ter18b.htm](http://www.religioustolerance.org/reac_ter18b.htm).

<sup>50</sup> Similar quotes from Christian scripture include these: "Those who do not believe will be condemned" (Jesus in Mark 16:16). "If anyone speaks against the Holy Spirit, for him there is no forgiveness, either in this age or in the age to come" (Jesus in Matthew 12:32). "There is no salvation in anyone else at all, for there is no [one other than Jesus] ...

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by which we may receive salvation" (Peter in Acts 4:12). Echoing these views is R. Albert Mohler Jr. of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary: "Any belief system" leading "away from the cross of Christ and toward another way of ultimate meaning is, indeed, wicked and evil." In 2003, quoted in Frank Rich, "A High-Tech Lynching in Prime Time," New York Times, April 24, 2005.

- <sup>51</sup> These commonizing efforts are described in E.H. Dance, History the Betrayer (London: Hutchinson, 1960): 126-150. The results are described in Paul M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1973): 77-100. Also relevant are Nicholas Pronay and Keith Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of German and Her Allies After World War II (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1985); and Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, eds., Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States (New York: Berg, 1987).
- <sup>52</sup> A number of NGOs now include the commonization of history in their peacemaking tool kit. What's still lacking is an institution that preemptively audits and opposes chauvinist history-teaching before conflicts develop.
- <sup>53</sup> Discussing past US efforts to make peace is Timothy Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
- <sup>54</sup> My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists. She concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of US counterterrorism policy.
- <sup>55</sup> As he left office in fall 2008 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert revealed his belief that Israel must make peace along Clinton Plan lines. Specifically, that Israel it must withdraw from "almost all" of the West Bank and share Jerusalem with the Palestinians. Uri Avnery's Column, "Summing Up," October 4, 2008, <http://zope-gush-shalom.org/home/en/channels/avnery/1223200150/>. But Olmert feared to state these positions while serving as Prime Minister. US pressure for peace might have allowed him to lead Israel toward these goals while in office, as he could have had greater confidence that his steps toward compromise would bring reciprocal results from the Palestinians, as he would have known that the US would use carrots and sticks to persuade the Palestinians to reciprocate.
- <sup>56</sup> These terms seem plausible: Pakistan agrees to accept the line of control as the international border; India agrees to stop stealing elections in Kashmir and to grant it autonomy.